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AFFAIRS OF OFFICE 
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, THE ELECTION OF 1828, 
AND THE MAKING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
RICHARD R. JOHN 
SHORTLY AFTER THE INAUGURATION in March 1829 of An-drew Jackson as the seventh president of the United States, the in-fluential Unitarian clergyman William Ellery Channing questioned 
the rationale for broadening the mandate of the government over which 
Jackson presided. The Constitution had established a national market, 
the federal courts had brokered disputes that might otherwise turn vio-
lent, and the Post Office Department had created a "chain of syn1pathies" 
that transformed the far-flung states into "one great neighborhood. "1 
Why should legislators undertake new initiatives that might imperil the 
"actual beneficent influence" that these governmental institutions were 
already exerting?2 High tariffs impeded "unrestricted commerce"-the 
"most important means of diffusing through the world knowledge, arts, 
comforts, civilization, religion, and liberty. "3 Federal public works raised 
constitutional questions of "no small difficulty" that would almost cer-
tainly embroil Congress in "endless and ever-multiplying intrigues" and 
become a "fountain of bitterness and discord. "4 "In our republic," Chan-
ning concluded, "the aim of Congress should be to stamp its legislation 
with all possible simplicity, and to abstain from measures, which, by their 
complication, obscurity, and uncertainty, must distract the public mind, 
and throw it into agitation and angry controversy. "5 As a people, we want 
"no new excitement": "Our danger is from overaction, from impatient 
and selfish enterprise, from feverish energy, from too rapid growth, rather 
than from stagnation and lethargy. "6 
Channing's remarks highlight two axioms of American politics that 
Jackson's contemporaries took for granted but which present-day com-
mentators sometimes forget. By 1829, the central government had already 
become a leading actor on the national stage, and any broadening of its 
mandate was likely to prove Contentious ·and might even put the Union 
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at risk. In this way, Channing provides a frame of reference for this essay, 
which explores the relationship between state building and party form~­
tion in the period between~e Missouri crisis 0£1819-1821 and the aboli-
tionist mails controversy of 1835. 
This essay contends that the rise of the federal exec.utive departments 
in the decades preceding Jackson's victory in the electlon of 1828 was a 
necessary precondition for the emergence of the Democratic party in the 
months immediately following Jackson's inauguration. It fur~er con-
tends that the political orbit around which Jackson's Democrati~ par~ 
revolved had been subtly yet fundamentally reoriented by the Missouri 
crisis of 1819-1821. · 
The federal executive departments were organized in the first federal 
Congress (1789-1793) in accordance with principles outlined in the fed-
eral Constitution. The most important were the Treasury Department, the 
State Department, the War Department, and the Post Office Department. 
Their rise during the next four decades was slow yet steady. As they ~r~': 
larger and more geographically extensive, they assumed n~w respons~b1h­
ties increased their organizational capabilities, and acquired a consider-abl~ measure of bureaucratic autonomy-which, by the 1820s, tempted 
ambitious department heads eager to advance their political careers. 
The Democratic party received its initial impetus fr?m the het~roge­
neous political coalition that backed Andrew Jac.kson 1:1.the election of 
1824. The coalition failed when, in a controversial dec1s1on, the House 
of Representatives rejected Jackson in favor of John Quincy Adams, even 
though Jackson had received more votes from both the electoral college 
and the electorate. It triumphed in 1828 when Jackson defeated Adams 
in the electoral college. In the months immediately following Jackson'.s 
inauguration the coalition became transformed into the Democratlc 
party, the lin~al ancestor of the Democ~ati~ pa~ty of to~ay .. 7 The Demo-
cratic party was a genuinely new kind of mstltut1on, mak1~g its emergen~e 
an unusual event and as such, one that invites explanation. It was, as is 
often noted the world's first mass party, in the sense that it was a self-perpetuatin~ organization that mobilized a large and divers.e elec:orate 
on a regular basis in order to win elections and shape public policy. In 
addition, it was the first political party in the United Sta~e~ to unreserve~ly 
champion democracy. For each of these reasons, its or1g.1n~ have l~ng m-
trigued students of American pu.blic life. Froi:i whence did it come. ;x'hat 
best explains its emergence during. the opening months of Jacks~n s. ad; 
ministration, a half century after the adoption of the federal Constitution. 
Recent scholarship on the making of the Democratic party traces its ori-
gins to a constellation of disruptive economi~ changes-;often te~med the 
''market revolution"-that triggered the Paruc of 1819. Jackson1ans and 
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Democrats are supposed to have opposed market expansion; National 
Republicans and Whigs to have embraced it. Proponents of this view 
typically examine party formation from the standpoint of the electorate 
rather than party leaders, and dismiss the central government as little 
more than the arena within which the struggle over market expansion 
was waged. To clinch their argument, they highlight social divisions 
within the electorate that postdated the establishment of the Democratic 
party. Few demonstrate how these divisions explain the initial organiza-
tion of the party in the months following Jackson's inauguration, or why 
party leaders made government corruption rather than market expansion 
the focus of Jackson's 1828 election campaign. This is not altogether 
s~rprising, since the favored methodology of these historians-the analy-
sis of aggregate data using behavioral assumptions-is unsuited to the 
analysis of specific events. 
One limi~ation of the "market revolution" thesis is the tendency of its 
proponents to exaggerate the aversion of ordinary Americans to market 
expansion. "The pleasing rhetoric of Jackson's moralizing fables notwith-
standing," as one critic has aptly remarked, "Americans demanded the 
market revolution long before they understood it. ... "9 There is, in short 
little reason to assume that hostility to market expansion hastened th~ 
Jacksonian ascendancy-or, for that matter, that the "revolution" that 
swept Andrew Jackson into the White House in 1828 originated with the 
people rather than with the politicians. On the contrary, as Robert V. 
Remini contended almost a half century ago, this "revolution" moved in 
"one direction only-from the top down. "10 
Just as scholars have exaggerated the economic traditionalism of the 
Democratic party, so, too, they have overstated its administrative moder-
nity. Some three decades ago, historian Lynn L. Marshall and political 
scientist Matthew Crenson credited the Jacksonians with introducing to 
the central government the routinized administrative procedures that 
have c~me to be known as bureaucracy.11 For Marshall, bureaucracy was 
a solution to economic inefficiency; for Crenson, a response to social dis-
order. Both regarded it as a Jacksonian legacy and hailed Jackson's post-
master general, Amos Kendall, as its guiding spirit. 12 
The Mars~all-Crenson thesis neatly inverted the older view, originated 
by Jackson's contemporaries and endorsed by subsequent commentators 
for almost a century, that the Jacksonians weakened the administrative 
capacity of the central government by dismantling a preexisting bureau-
cracy and instituting a "spoils system" that replaced meritorious adminis-
trators with party hacks. For Marshall and Crenson, partisan maneuvering 
had the opposite effect of encouraging administrative reform. Or, as one 
enthusiastic proponent of their thesis put it: "Spoils bred bureaucracy. ,,13 
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The Marshall-Crenson thesis has long been endorsed by political scien-
tists interested in probing the origins of the modern American state.14 Yet 
it rests on a slim empiricp,l base. Several of the bureaucratic precedents 
that the Jacksonians had supposedly invented had, in fact, originated in 
the eighteenth century and had been significantly refined by a previous 
generation of public administrators that included Treasury Secretary Wil-
liam H. CraMord, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, and Postmaster 
General John McLean. Once in office, the Jacksonians did little to mod-
ernize the administrative apparatus. If anything, their often clumsy direc-
tives made the administration of the executive departments even more 
burdensome and complex.15 
Symptomatic of the problems with the Marshall-Crenson thesis is its 
treatment of the deliberate reorganizations of the executive departments 
that took place during Jackson's presidency-the "first practical test," 
Marshall gushed, of "innovative techniques of large-scale rational organi-
zation on a peculiarly American model." 16 A case in point was the reorga-
nization of the Post Office Department that followed the enactment of 
the Post Office Act of 1836. Both Marshall and Crenson attributed this 
legislation to Kendall and hailed it as the quintessentialJacksonian admin-
istrative reform. In fact, however, the Post Office Act of 1836 originated 
with neither the Jacksonians nor the executive. Rather, it was a congres-
sional response to a humiliating postal finance scandal that haunted the 
Jacksonians during Jackson's second term. It was pushed through Con-
gress not by Kendall but, rather, by a bipartisan coalition headed by anti-
Jacksonian Whigs. For a time, Jacksonian party leaders actually opposed 
its enactment in the fear that public exposure of their administrative 
shortcomings might hurt them at the polls.17 
Marshall and Crenson's erroneous contention that the origins of the 
federal bureaucracy did not emerge until the 1830s-a half century after 
the adoption of the Constitution-is emblematic of an even more basic 
mischaracterization of the early American state. It has long been a cliche 
to dismiss the central government in the early republic as a "midget insti-
tution in a giant land. " 18 The early American state, as political scientist 
Stephen Skowronek has declared in a widely influential formulation, was 
a "state of courts and parties," an "innocuous reflection" of the wider 
society in which executive departments were unimportant and a "sense 
of statelessness" was a hallmark of American political culture.19 
The origins of this "courts and parties" school are complex.20 Its persis-
tence owes more than a little to the continuing influence of the disparag-
ing-and indeed almost comic-portrait of the early Washington political 
establishment that political scientist James Sterling Young limned in his 
prizewinning Washington Community.21 In this behaviorist tour de force, 
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first published in 1966, Young attributed congressional voting patterns in 
the period between 1800 and 1828 less to party loyalty, public demand, 
or considerations of public policy than to the highly localized, and largely 
idiosyncratic, alliances that legislators forged in Capitol Hill boarding-
houses. Not until the Jacksonians established the mass party, Young con-
cluded, would public figures devise effective ways to link the government 
and the governed. 22 
For over three decades, Young's Washington Community has beguiled 
historians and political scientists with its methodological novelty, artful 
argumentation, and literary charm. Unfortunately, as numerous critics 
have demonstrated, it is neither a full nor an accurate guide to the main-
springs of national politics during the early republic. Young underesti-
mated the organizational capabilities of the executive departments, ne-
glected policy issues, and discounted discrete events, such as the Missouri 
crisis (whi7h is not even listed in the index).23 In addition, he exaggerated 
the insulation of the citizenry from the central government in the period 
preceding the advent of the mass party. In particular, he ignored the many 
intermediary institutions that, long before 1828, linked the central govern-
ment and the wider world. Of these, the most notable included the petition 
process, the newspaper press, the postal system, and nationally oriented 
voluntary associations. Most devastatingly, Young embellished his argu-
ment with suggestive snippets from primary documents that he sometimes 
took out of context and that often rested, as critics have politely observed, 
on a "highly imaginative" reading of the evidence.24 In short, the continu-
ing popularity of Washington Community as a foundational text for stu-
dents of American political developinent says more about the mistaken 
yet seductive and enduring appeal of a simple and uncomplicated past 
than it does about national politics in a formative age. 
The remainder of this essay explores the relationship between the federal 
executive departments and the Democratic party. It builds on the insight, 
derived from political scientists and historical sociologists, that political 
events can have political origins and governmental institutions can be 
agents of change. In so doing, it challenges the common assumption that 
political events are, in some fundamental sense, the product of deeper 
or underlyirig social circumstances that originate outside of the political 
realm.25 
Since arguments about the early American state are often misconstrued, 
it may be helpful to begin with a pair of disclaimers. It is not my intention 
to contend that, in the early republic, the American state was synonymous 
with the central government {let alone the executive departments). In this 
period-as today-the American state (or polity) consisted of a variety of 
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institutions that included the states and localities as well as federalism 
and the common law. It is, similarly, not my intention to downplay the 
differences between the eikecutive departments in the early republic and 
the administrative apparatus that has emerged since the Progressive Era. 
Much could be learned by tracing the continuities and discontinuities be-
tween, say, the War Department in the 1820s under John C. Calhoun an~ 
the Commerce Department in the 1920s under Herbert Hoover. Yet it 
would be anachronistic to treat the former as a microcosm of the latter-
or, more broadly, to view nineteenth-century governmental institutions 
through a twentieth-century lens. This essay contends, on th~ contr~ry, 
that the origins of the Democratic party are best understood 1n relation 
to the rise of the executive departments in the period preceding the elec-
tion of 1828. 
Political commentators in the early republic took it for granted that the 
central government was an important institution and that the broadening 
of its mandate could threaten vested interests. Some, like Channing, op-
posed a broadened mandate; others, like John Quincy Adams, endorsed 
it. Few denied that the central government was an influential agent of 
change. . . . 
The ubiquity of this mental outlook owed much to the cont1nu~g m-
fluence in the early republic of certain habits of mind that had been influ-
ential in the late eighteenth century among the founders of the American 
republic. Known today as the "whig," "classical republican," or "country 
party" tradition, this mind-set had been pop~ar~ed in seventee~th-cen­
tuty England by writers opposed to the consohdat10n of the English state 
and the establishment of the Bank of England. Among its tenets were the 
presumptions that political parties were evil, that economic conditions 
were a product of political fiat, and that the manipulatio~ of governmei:t 
patronage for partisan ends was the essence of corruption.26 Paradox1-
~ally, some of the same historians who treat this mind-s~t with the ~tm~st 
seriousness when it found expression during the revolutionary era dismiss 
it as anachronistic and even paranoid when it was revived in the early 
republic. This was true even though, by almost any measure, the central 
government in the 1820s was more powerful-in the sens~ of comm~nd­
ing more resources, controlling more patronage, and reach1n~ farther into 
the hinterland-than the imperial state in British North America had been 
in the period prior to 1775. The cultural repertoire of the early republic-
like that of any epoch-was limited, and antistatism was one of its defin-
ing motifs. The specter of governmental consolidation, .decl~red Fre~ch 
traveler Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America-m reflecting 
on a trip to the United States that he had taken between 1831and1832-
was the "one great fear" that haunted public figures throughout the 
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~nite~ States.27 Toc~ueville dismissed this fear as overblown, citing the 
~1vers1ty of the American people; for Channing, it was precisely this diver-
sity that was cause for concern. 
Th~ Dem~cratic party emerged in a political universe that had changed 
radICally smce the founders of the American republic drafted the federal 
constitution in 1787. The founders' political economy had focused reso-
lutely o:i Europe. With the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, a new 
generation of statesmen reoriented the American political economy to-
ward the vast North American interior. To facilitate the expansion of the 
home market, legislators promulgated an ambitious legislative agenda 
th~t ':ould later become known as the "American System." Among its 
pr1nc1pal elements were a new national bank, a protective tariff, the or-
derly s~ttle?1ent of public lands, and the construction of public works. 
Begmn~ng ,1n 1816, much of this agenda was enacted. Legislative land-
marks mcluded the rechartering of the Bank of the United States in 1816· 
the tariffs of 1816, 1824, and 1828; the Land Act of 1820; and the Gen'. 
e:al Survey Act of 1824. Its primary judicial expression was the affirma-
tion_ of the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States by Chief 
Jusnce John Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland (1819). 
Among the public figures to promote this ambitious agenda were Henry 
Clay, John Quincy Adams, and John McLean. John C. Calhoun also sup-
~orte? It early on, only to shift his position in response to changing condi-
tlons In South Carolina. For these "National Republicans," as they would 
come to be known, the founders' bold experiment in republican govern-
ment was open-ended, and the central government a progressive, develop-
mental force. 28 
The implementation of this developmental agenda ensured the continu-
ing e!aboration of the federal executive departments, which had been 
growing steadily since the 1790s.29 In the United States, no less than in 
France, Germany, or Great Britain, big government preceded big business. 
By 1828, over 10,000 people staffed the myriad post offices, land offices, 
~nd customhouses that were scattered throughout the country. An addi-
~1onal 12,000 served in the military, half in the navy and marines and half 
ill th~ army~ S~ationed mostly in the West. The size and geographical reach 
?f this adm1n1strative apparatus far exceeded that of any other institution 
11: ~~e country. No private enterprise could match the organizational capa-
b1ht1es of the Post Office Department, the Treasury Department, or the 
War Department. The Post Office Department alone had eight thousand 
offices, makmg it not only the largest public agency in the United States 
but al~o one of the largest, most a-dministratively complex, and most geo-
graphically far-flung organizations in the world. 
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As the executive departments grew larger and more complex, ordinary 
Americans ratcheted up their expectations with regard to the kinds of 
benefits that they wishe4,,them to provide. In the realms of communica-
tions and transportation, popular demand for new and improved facilities 
was steady and insistent. Beginning in the 1790s, individuals throughout 
the United States successfully petitioned Congress to extend the postal 
network throughout the trans-Appalachian hinterland.30 Before long, 
many came to regard mail delivery as a fundamental right, or what we 
would today call an entitlement. Most postal petitioners requested merely 
that Congress increase the number of routes upon which the mail was 
transmitted; only occasionally, and in special circumstances, did they also 
demand that the central government improve the roads over which the 
mail was conveyed. By the 1820s, this began to change. For many, it now 
seemed but a matter of time before the citizenry would compel Congress 
to bring the transportation infrastructure up to the level that the postal 
network had already attained. 
The General Survey Act of 1824 was a legislative response to this popu-
lar demand. By creating a Board of Engineers to oversee the design of 
future public works, it validated the growing popular presumption that 
the central government had a mandate to construct a national system of 
roads and canals. In so doing, it paralleled the Post Office Act of 1792, 
which had established an analogous precedent for the elaboration of the 
republic's postal network. Following the enactment of the General Survey 
Act, popular expectations with respect to the kind of public works projects 
that the central government ought to undertake soared.31 Between 1824 
and 1828, ninety public works projects received federal funding-includ-
ing the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal-inaugurating an internal improve-
ments boom that would continue well into the Jackson administration. 
Talent gravitates to power, and, in the 1820s, the executive departments 
_became nurseries for presidential aspirants. John McLean used his posi-
tion as head of the Post Office Department to catapult himself from al-
most total obscurity into a perennial presidential contender. In the elec-
tion of 1824, three of the five principal candidates-Adams, Calhoun, 
and William H. Crawford-were department heads, while a fourth, 
Henry Clay, would soon be appointed secretary of state. Political insiders 
took it for granted that Crawford, as treasury secretary, was manipulating 
the four years law-which mandated the reappointment of the principal 
treasury officers every four years-to build a political machine. Should 
Crawford win in 1824, it was publicly announced that he would sweep 
the offices, encouraging speculation about appointments to positions 
from which the incumbents had yet to be displaced.32 Calhoun, similarly, 
was assumed to be stealthily building a vast public works empire in the 
Department of War, to which the Board of Engineers had been attached. 
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In addition, Calhoun was quietly elaborating plans for the relocation of 
the remaining eastern tribes to the west of the Mississippi-laying the 
groundwork for the enactment, during Jackson's presidency, of the Indian 
Removal Act. 
The alleged maladministration of the executive departments was a lead-
ing issue in the 1824 presidential campaign. Calhounites accused Craw-
ford of official malfeasance, while Jacksonians attacked the federal bu-
reaucracy as corrupt. For Jackson stalwart John Eaton, author of the 
anonymous Letters of Wyoming, Jackson's lack of executive experience 
became his most valuable asset-since it ensured that he, alone among 
the candidates, had never manipulated executive patronage to advance 
his career.33 For the first time in the history of the republic, a presidential 
aspirant was portrayed as a virtuous outsider determined to take on the 
Washington establishment. 
The growing prominence of department heads in national politics helps 
to explain why numerous contemporaries, as well as many historians, 
have characterized the executive branch under James Monroe and 
John Quincy Adams as weak. Whether or not the presidents in this period 
were weak is a debatable point; there can be no question, however, that 
the department heads were strong. The postmaster general, the treasury 
secretary, and the secretary of war each enjoyed an impressive measure 
of bureaucratic autonomy, due, in large part, to their uncontested author-
ity over the patronage that their departments disbursed. Predictably, they 
grew accustomed to negotiating directly with power brokers within Con-
gress and the states, raising the specter of corruption and occasioning 
frequent embarrassm-ent for Monroe and Adams.34 
The executive departments played an equally conspicuous role in the 
1828 presidential campiign. The 1828 election was by far the most ex-
pensive to have been waged in the United States up to that point in time. 
Though it is impossible to know for certain, it probably cost around $1 
million to elect Jackson president. This expense was borne primarily not 
by Jackson's supporters but, rather, by the Post Office Department 
through various hidden subsidies that postal patrons paid on their mail.35 
Of these subsidies, the most important was the franking privilege, which 
granted cert~in public officers-including postmasters-the privilege to 
send an unlimited number of pamphlets, newspapers, and letters through 
the mail. 
The Jackson campaign was coordinated from Washington, D.C., by 
·Duff Green, a Missouri-based entrepreneur who in 1826 had secured the 
editorship of the Washington-based United States Telegraph. Green used 
the Telegraph to coordinate a far-flung media blitz that embraced a galaxy 
of strategically located Jacksonian newspapers. Had postal facilities re-
mained as limited as they had been in 1800, it would have been technically 
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impossible to mount such an elaborate campaign. In the absence of the 
franking privilege, it would have been prohibitively expensive. 
Green recognized in thji1• supposed maladministration of the executive 
departments a compelling campaign issue, and freely elaborated in the 
Telegraph on themes that Eaton had raised in his Letters of Wyoming. In 
editorial after editorial, Green lambasted the "corruption" that executive 
patronage had supposedly fostered and trumpeted the need for "retrench-
ment and reform." No issue preoccupied Green more than Adams's ap-
pointment of Clay as Adam.s's secretary of state soon after Clay had se-
cured Adams the vote of the Kentucky delegation during the 1824 
presidential election-an outcome Green derided, in the best tradition of 
eighteenth-century English opposition writer James Burgh, as a "corrupt 
bargain." Adams, Green contended, had rewarded Clay with a lucrative 
office in an executive department in return for Clay's support in securing 
Adams's election. 
In a certain sense, Green's anticorruptionisrn marked a shift in the Jack-
sonians' appeal. As recently as 1821, Jackson himself had denounced the 
"mania for retrenchment," while, as a Tennessee senator between 1823 
and 1825, he had supported a protective tariff and federal public works.36 
Yet Green's verbal assault reflected far more than merely his outrage at 
Adams's appointment of Clay. Eaton's Letters of Wyoming, after all, had 
been published before the House vote that decided the election of 1824. 
Rather, Green built upon, and exploited, the pervasive anxiety about the 
evils of governmental consolidation that Tocqueville had reflected upon 
in his Democracy. The rise of the executive departments-declared Jack-
sonian stalwart Thomas Hart Benton, in a congressional report on execu-
tive patronage that he authored in 1826-"completely falsified" James 
Madison's celebrated contention in Federalist 45 and 46 (1788) that the 
central government would never acquire the resources to challenge the 
prerogative of the states. Should Congress fail to enact rernedi~l legisla-
tion, Benton warned, the central government would soon dominate the 
states as effectively as if they were "so many provinces of one vast em-
pire. ,,37 Benton greatly exaggerated the impending demise of states' rig~ts; 
yet his report documented the extent to which the rise of the e~ecut1ve 
departments had rendered anticorruptioriism plausible. The growing pop-
ular demand for public works had an analogous effect. Had Adams not 
appointed Clay as his secretary of state, Green would have had little trou-
ble inventing some other "corrupt bargain" with which to taunt the 
Adamsites and embolden the Jackson campaign. 
Green's editorial stance helped bridge the ideological divide between 
Jackson's early supporters, most of whom hailed from the West, and the 
many southerners who had initially backed Crawford in 1824, but who 
eventually swung around to Jackson following Crawford's defeat. For 
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westerners intent on rapid commercial development, anticorruptionism 
cast ~e central government as an impediment to the release of entrepre-
~eur1~l ener~y. ~or .southerners fe~rful that the central government might 
rmp~r1! the ~stitut1on of slavery, it provided reassurance that a Jackson 
a~m1n1strat1on would champion no new government initiatives that 
might put their interests at risk. 
The rise of the executive departments might in other circumstances 
have bei:iefited the Adams campaign. After all, Adams, as president, had-
a: least tn theory-control over the patronage that his department heads 
disbursed. In practice, however, Adams refused to interfere with his de-
partment heads' autonomy, depriving himself of a resource that might 
well have strengthened his campaign. Adams went so far as to retain John 
McLean as his postmaster general, even though McLean was widely pre-
sum~d (correctly) to have been surreptitiously dispensing postal patron-
age in order to hasten Adams's defeat-and, or so McLean hoped, boost 
McLean's own presidential aspirations. "Patronage is a sacred trust " 
Mc~ean sanctimoniously lectured Massachusetts Adamsite Edward Ev:r-
:tt, in rebuffing E~erett's efforts to appoint Adams's supporters to office: 
It was never designed for the personal gratification of the individual 
holding it." Should political supporters be rewarded with official prefer-
~ent, the "struggle for office" would be perpetual and "thus would per-
ish, perhaps forever, the best hope of man. "38 Everett saw matters differ-
ently._ P~esident Adams, Everett observed, made the "experiment" of 
appo1nt1ng public officers with "exclusive regard to merit," and "what 
has been the. re~ar~"? A "most furious opposition, rallied on the charge 
of corrupt d1str1but1on of office, and the open or secret hostility of three-
fourths of the officeholders in the Union. "39 In Great Britain, Everett elab-
orat~d, there existed a multitude of options for ambitious men seeking 
public ~enown, including the military and the peerage. In the United 
States, 1n con~ast, there was noth~ng but public office. As a consequence, 
~verett expla.1ned, :he lure of offic~al preferment was virtually irresistible: 
Office here is ~amily,.rank, ~er~d1ta~y fortune, in short everything out of 
the range .of private life.' This. hnks its possession with innate principles 
of our n~r:o~; and truly 1ncred1ble are the efforts men are willing to make, 
the hum1hat1on they will endure, to get it. "40 
For Green, the promise of official preferment was a tempting reward to 
dangle before the party workers who coordinated the Jackson campaign. 
Iron1cal~y, t~e very practices that Green attacked as corrupt gave him a 
~ompel11ng incentive with which to tantalize his supporters. By lambast-
ing the Adams administration for its manipulation of executive patron-
age, G~een established a plausible rationale for a general sweep of the 
executive departm~nts. In~ee~, it was largely for this reason that party 
workers found ant1corrupt1on1sm so compelling. From their perspective, 
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it held out the promise of a rich harvest in offices and contracts should 
Jackson prevail. And who could have a better claim on these perquisites 
than the men who had e11gineered Adams"s defeat? 
Jackson's critics agreed. The "mass" of all the political parties of the 
day, Everett perceptively observed shortly before the election, was held 
together not by principle-as political parties had been in the 1790s, when 
the Federalists battled the Republicans-but, rather, by the "hope of of-
fice, and its honors and emolurnents."41 Should Jackson publicly pro-
claim, Everett wryly predicted, that, if victorious, he would dismiss none 
of his political antagonists and appoint no one on account of his political 
support, this would "cost him every vote out of Tennessee. "42 
For sensitive observers such as Channing, the brazenness of the scram-
ble for office was appalling. The selection of a president, Channing 
warned, though a "comparatively inferior concern"-in relation to, for 
example, to the deliberations of Congress-had become so all-consuming 
that the quadrennial campaigns for the "Executive Department" had 
come to pose the single greatest immediate threat to the Union. It would 
be better, Channing concluded, to choose the president by lot, rather than 
to "repeat the degrading struggle through which we have recently 
passed."43 
Jackson's victory paved the way for the establishment of the-Democratic 
party as a self-perpetuating organization. To set the stage for the much 
heralded purge, Green publicly announced in the Telegraph that Jackson 
would "reward his friends and punish his enemies. "44 In the "distribution 
of the federal patronage"-Green explained to one Jackson supporter, 
shortly before Jackson's inauguration-"GeneralJackson will have much 
in his power. He can enrich and strengthen his party by a transfer of 
the lucrative offices into sound hands." 45 With other Jackson supporters, 
_Green was more forthright. "How is your postmaster?" Green queried a 
campaign worker shortly before Jackson's inauguration: "Can't I serve 
you there? Or can't I obtain for you a mail contract? Let me hear from 
you fully on these points .... I am now in a position where I can serve 
my friends .... "46 
In response to Green's call, hundreds of would-be-officeholders de-
scended on Washington. Little wonder that Jackson's inauguration turned 
into a near riot. The principal attendees were not sturdy backwoodsmen 
drawn to the capital to witness the "first people's inaugural," as genera-
tions of historians have naively assumed.47 Rather, they were expectant 
officeholders ravenous for spoils.48 
The partisan dismissals that began shortly after Jackson's inauguration 
were a genuinely new development in American politics. Long before 
1829, partisan dismissals had become familiar features of electoral poli-
62 JOHN 
tics in the Middle Atlantic states-and, in particular, in New York and 
Pennsylvania. Yet nothing even remotely like the purge that Green had 
prefigured in the Telegraph had ever before taken place in Washington, 
D.C.49 For the first time in American history, public figures throughout 
the country observed the workings of patronage politics as they had come 
to be practiced in Albany and Harrisburg. For many, including some of 
Jackson's oldest supporters, it was an appalling spectacle, and one that 
would dominate popular perceptions of Jackson's administration for one 
hundred years. The revulsion at the Jacksonians' conduct was particularly 
widespread in the South, where northern patronage practices remained 
unknown. Writing in 1861, Jackson biographer James Parton articulated 
the shared consensus. Even if all of Jackson's other executive decisions 
had been commendable, Parton concluded, his acquiescence in the parti-
san dismissal of meritorious public officers would still render his adminis-
tration deplorable. 50 Only after civil service reform had supplanted the 
"spoils system," as the Jacksonian patronage policy would come to be 
known, would historians fix the spotlight on other features of Jackson's 
administration, such as Jackson's support for Indian removal or his war 
on the bank. 51 
Among the first officeholders to be displaced was McLean. Since 
Mclean had covertly backed Jackson's election, he might seem like an 
unlikely victim of a partisan sweep. Yet Jacksonian party leaders had no 
intention of permitting him to retain control over a department that con-
trolled such an abundance of contracts and jobs. After all, McLean had 
been a leading proponent of the public trust doctrine and had no desire 
to preside over a partisan h1rnout of his staff, Jackson neatly resolved 
what might otherwise hf!ve become his first cabinet crisis by appointing 
him to a vacant seat on the Supreme Court-somewhat to McLean's cha-
grin, since he had hoped he might become head of the War Department, 
with all of the power and patronage that it controlled. Once McLean 
was out of the way-and the weak-willed William Barry installed as his 
successor-the purge of the Post Office Department could proceed, just 
as Green had intended. 
The significance of the partisan dismissals is easily overlooked. Con-
sider the changes in the Post Office Department, the source of the vast 
majority of federal jobs. During the eight years of Jackson's presidency, 
postal administrators dismissed 13 percent of the postmasters in the coun-
try. This percentage was not markedly different from that of previous 
administrations-and, in fact, it has often been interpreted as proof that 
the Jacksonians merely followed time-honored precedent. In fact, this per-
centage reveals little. Most postma:sterships paid little and, thus, were not 
considered patronage plums. 
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If o_ne breaks down the postal dismissals by region and level of compen-
sation, a more revealing pattern emerges. During the first year of Jack-
son's presidency, postal ~ministrators dismissed 38 percent of all the 
postmasters holding offices worth more than $300 in New England and 
the Middle Atlantic states, and 33 percent in the Northwest. In the South 
Atlantic, in contrast, they dismissed only slightly more than 2 percent of 
the postmasters who fell into this category.52 • • 
This pattern cannot be explained as a response to the economic ineffi-
ciency of the incumbents (pace Marshall) or the social disorder of the 
region in which the dismissals occurred (pace Crens_on). Ma~y too.k plac.e 
in New England, a region much admired for the high quality of its mail 
service and little prone to social disorder. Rather, it was a product of 
the deliberate party-building strategy of Jacksonian party leaders such as 
Green. The Jacksonians' political base was in the South a~d Wes:; by 
rewarding supporters in the North and East, party leaders bmlt a national 
party. "The aristocracy will retreat to New England and entrench them-
selves behind local patronage," Green confided to a Jackson supporter 
shortly before Jackson's inauguration: "Our policy then is obvious. We 
must carry the war into the enemies' camp and break down the force of 
their patronage by the influence of our principles and the aid of the federal 
patronage. "53 • • . 
While party leaders sometimes claimed that the partisan dismissals had 
democratized the civil government, in fact, they displayed scant animus 
against officeholders of high social standing. Displacing incumbents was 
far less important than rewarding supporters.54 Had party leader_s had 
some other kind of perquisite at their disposal, they might well have set-
tled their debts in some other way and left the administrative apparatus 
intact. To expose the hidden logic of the Jacksonians' strategy, follow the 
gioney. Many of the most lucrative public offices went to men who had 
invested heavily in Jackson's election campaign.55 
Party leaders rationalized their patronage policy by invoking the .tim:-
honored doctrine of rotation in office, which Jackson announced m his 
first annual message in December 1829. Rotation in office had long been 
urged by political theorists as a precaution against the evils that might 
ensue should ambitious and grasping men monopolize the most powerful 
and prestigious public offices such as the presidency. The_ Jacksonians' 
innovation was to extend the doctrine to almost every office in the govern-
ment including thousands of minor positions-such as village postmas-
tershlps-that involved little administrative discret~on. Rotatio~ super-
seded-and, in large measure, overturned-the public trust doctrme that 
McLean had articulated during his tenure as postmaster general. 
McLean's public tr-Ust doctrine had established the presumption that of-
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ficeholders had the right to remain in office unless they had been guilty 
of a dereliction of duty. Rotation in office nullified this presumption.56 
In no sense was rotation in office a core Jacksonian belief. It had never 
been broached during the 1824 campaign and was not openly discussed 
until after Jackson's inauguration-even by party insiders.57 Jackson him-
self does not appear to have alluded to it in writing until several months 
following his inauguration, when he observed in a private memorandum 
book that it would "perpetuate our liberty."58 Only slowly and haltingly 
would it acquire a prominent place in the political lexicon. Indeed, it 
would hardly be an exaggeration to suggest that rotation in office has 
received more approving commentary from twentieth-century historians 
than it did in Jackson's own day. In the years immediately following Jack-
son's i1:1auguration, for example, Jackson's congressional supporters only 
rarely invoked rotation to justify the staffing changes that Jackson's ad-
ministrators.oversaw. And almost never did they echo the blunt yet honest 
assessment of New York senator William L. Marcy, who in 1832 asserted 
that the new administration had a right to appoint supporters to office, 
since "to the victor belongs the spoils. "59 Most continued to maintain-
sometimes with little effort to conceal their blatant hypocrisy-that the 
public trust doctrine remained intact, and that every dismissed office-
holder was guilty of some kind of dereliction of duty. This was true even 
though everyone familiar with the specifics of the appointment process 
understood that the only impropriety with which the vast majority of ex-
officeholders could justly stand accused was the possession of an office 
coveted by party leaders as a reward for party workers. Jackson himself 
repeated this outrageous canard in a private letter to a longtime supporter 
as la~e as 1832, in which he dared an opposition editor to name a single 
public officer whom his administration had dismissed who had "not been 
swindling the government or was not a defaulter. "60 
Opposition to rotation was by no means confined to administration 
critics. It sparked sharp dissent from wi~hinjackson's cabinet and among 
some of Jackson's most loyal supporters. Rotation was also unpopular 
among the influential Washington society matrons who in previous ad-
ministrations_ had worked diligently behind the scenes to match promising 
young men with suitable government berths. 61 Few doubted that the new 
doctrine was anything more than a thinly veiled rationalization for the 
bestowal of lucrative offices upon campaign workers. In the political vo-
cabulary of the day, this was not reform but corruption-the same charge 
that the Jacksonians had leveled against the Adamsites during the preced-
ing campaign. 
Notwithstanding its unpopularity, rotation in office gave party leaders 
the necessary incentives to transform the Jacksonian coalition into the 
Democratic party. The partisan dismissals helped the Jacksonians pay 
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their campaign debts; rotation in office changed the rules of the game. 
The significance of this shift was independent of, and can in no sense 
be conflated with, the perco.ntage of officeholders whom the Jacksonians 
dismissed. By creating a mechanism for the periodic replacement of a 
substantial fraction of the civil government, rotation established the mate-
rial basis for the mass party as a self-perpetuating organization-a new 
institution that, along with the voluntary association, was one of the most 
notable institutional innovations of the age. Prior to 1829, when a na-
tional public figure referred to the spoils of office, he typically had in mind 
the benefits that legislators bestowed upon their constituents.62 Following 
Jackson's' victory, the spoils would increasingly come to refer merely to 
the perquisites that party leaders lavished on campaign workers. Rather 
than something to fight for, the spoils became, as it were, something to 
fight with.63 
Grafted by party leaders onto a preexisting administrative apparatus, 
Jackson's Democratic party grew in fertile soil. In less than a decade, the 
Post Office Department had been transformed from the central adminis-
trative apparatus of the early American state into the wellspring of the 
mass party. In the process, it helped underwrite the distinctive election-
eering style that would dominate presidential politics in the United States 
for the next eighty years. 
President Jackson is often credited with strengthening the presidency by 
establishing a direct relationship with the American people and by declar-
ing, in his nullification proclamation, that secession was treason and the 
Union perpetual.64 
Jackson may have strengthened the presidency, yet his administration 
significantly weakened the organizational capabilities of the central gov-
ernment. This was largely by design. The main thrust of Jackson's admin-
istration was to reduce, whenever possible, the role of government in 
American life.65 By blocking internal improvements, endorsing tariff re-
duction, disbanding the Board of Engineers, vetoing a major land bill, 
and opposing the rechartering of the Bank of the United States, Jackson 
affirmed his faith in an antidevelopmental, states' right agenda quite dif-
ferent from the prodevelopmental, nationally oriented agenda of Adams 
and Clay. Though Jackson is acclaimed a nationalist, in fact, he relied on 
states' rights principles even during the nullification controversy, when he 
deployed one variant of states' rights to challenge a competing variant 
promulgated by the nullifiers of South Carolina.66 Jackson's opposition 
to the bank was, similarly, less economic than political, and rooted in the 
traditional English "country party" fear that bank officials might deploy 
the patronage at their disposal to subvert the regilne-or, what was for 
Jackson the same thing, to underwrite the election campaign of his oppo-
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nents.67 Even Jackson's notorious struggles with his cabinet over Peggy 
Eaton and over the removal of the bank deposits had the effect-as may 
well have been their intent-of curtailing the bureaucratic autonomy of 
his department heads and undermining the relationships they had forged 
with local notables in the capital and the states. 68 
Jackson's endorsement of the rapid and inexpensive disbursement of 
the public lands also had an antidevelopmental rationale. By hastening 
the privatization of the public domain, Jackson discouraged the accumu-
°' lation of a surplus in the treasury that might provide the occasion for new 
federal initiatives that could threaten vested interests. Indian removal, the 
major legislative achievement of Jackson's first term, may have been de-
pendent on the army for its enforcement, yet it greatly increased the stock 
of cheap land and, thus, decreased the likelihood that the sale of the public 
domain would become a source of general revenue. Tariff reduction had 
an analogous logic, as did Jackson's determination to eliminate the federal 
debt, a goal he briefly attained in 1835. If the Treasury Department's 
coffers were bare, ambitious congressmen would lack the resources to 
embark on expansive new programs that might challenge the status quo. 
Rotation in office was consistent with this antidevelopmental agenda. 
By lowering the prestige of public office and forestalling the emergence 
of administrative expertise, it limited the ability of the executive depart-
ments to perform the tasks they had been assigned. Jacksonian appointees 
were almost always less qualified than the men they had supplanted and 
often became embroiled in scandal and graft. In every public agency that 
historians have scrutinized-the Post Office Department, the General 
Land Office, the military armory at Harper's Ferry, and the Army Corps 
of Engineers-the Jacksonians' administrative record fluctuated between 
the undistinguished and the abysmal. 69 Not until the twentieth century 
would the executive departments regain the prestige that they had at-
tained in the years immediately preceding Jackson's election. 
Early in Jackson's administration, Amos ICendall hailed Jackson's party 
for championing "simple, virtuous, and efficient government" and the 
abandonment of "all pretensions to power" that would "necessarily cre-
ate collisions with the states. "70 On the eve of the election of 1832, admin-
istration critic Alexander H. Everett offered up a rather less flattering 
assessment. By undermining federal prerogatives, defying the Supreme 
Court, and denying legislators "all their most important powers," the 
Jacksonians had attempted to "bring back the present Constitution to the 
imbecility of the Old Confederation. "71 
Jacksonian antidevelopmentalism provides insight into the political ethos 
that historians term "Jacksonian Democracy." To the extent that the Jack-
sonians can be said to have had a guiding vision, it was reactionary-
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they strove, that is, to restore the balance of power between the central 
government and the states that the rise of the executive departments had 
upset. Their project, as o~, historian sagely observed almost half a cen-
tury ago in reflecting upon Jackson's assault on the bank, was essentially 
a "dismantling operation."72 
Yet it was ultimately impossible for the Jacksonians to restore the re-
public to the days of its youth. For the Jacksonians were also heirs to the 
new political realities that had emerged following the Missouri crisis. 
They sought, in short, not only to parry the heightened expectations with 
which ordinary Americans looked to the central government, but also to 
diffuse the multiple' dangers that the slavery issue posed.73 
The Jacksonians fully endorsed the post-Missouri consensus-sus-
tained by nonslaveholders and slaveholders alike-that it was imperative 
to keep the slavery issue off the national political agenda. In the 1790s, 
it had been relatively easy to maintain this conspiracy of silence: the gov-
ernment was new and its mandate amorphous. The antislavery petition 
effort of Pennsylvania Quakers in 1790 may well have sparked an acrimo-
. nious congressional debate, yet the petitioners' appeals were swiftly re-
jected, and the controversy was soon forgotten. 74 By the 1810s, the slavery 
issue had become considerably more complex and less easily disposed of. 
During the Missouri crisis, some northern legislators went so far as to 
propose the imposition of restrictions on slavery as a condition for Mis-
souri statehood, a direct assault on slaveholder prerogatives that sparked 
a firestorm of opposition among political insiders in the slaveholding 
states. And by the 1820s, the national legislative agenda was crowded 
with ambitious proposals to purchase slaves and relocate free blacks-
proposals that were rendered increasingly plausible by the steadily gro~­
ing organizational capabilities of the executive departments. No one 
doubted that the Treasury Department possessed the requisite administra-
tive machinery to collect enormous sums of money from tariffs on im-
ported goods-or, for that matter, that the War Department commanded 
the necessary resources to remove entire Indian tribes to the west of_ the 
Mississippi. What, then, was to prevent an executive department from 
relocating free blacks outside of the country, or even undertaking a gen-
eral slave emancipation? 
For slaveholders and their allies, such questions were profoundly unset-
tling. Ever since the adoption of the Constitution, slaveholders had exer-
cised a disproportionate influence in national politics. Slaveholders were 
the major beneficiaries of the three-fifths clause, which augmented the 
political power of the slaveholding states. And in 1820, they secured a 
major congressional victory when they converted a slim restrictionist ma-
jority into a small antirestrictionist majority in order to secure the admis-




Shifting demographics, however, rendered the future uncertain. During 
the revolutionary era, many statesmen had echoed Jam es Madison's well-
known prediction that slaveholders would retain control of the levers of 
power following the adoption of the Constitution, since the population 
of the slaveholding states would increase faster than the population of 
the nonslaveholding states. By the 1820s, few doubted that Madison's 
prediction was wrong. As the nonslaveholding states surpassed the slave-
holding states in population, slaveholders recognized that they had best 
unite to prevent Congress from enacting legislation that might endanger 
prerogatives they had long taken for granted-including the right to own 
slaves.76 
Jacksonians understood the slaveholders' predicament. To articulate it, 
they recast in a popular idiom the antidevelopmental argument long es-
poused by the "Old Republicans" -a small yet purposeful group of south-
ern and, indeed, mostly Virginian statesmen, writers, and editors who had 
held aloft the mantle of Thomas Jefferson and the Republican party of 
the 1790s. Often dismissed as hopeless reactionaries during the presiden-
cies of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the Old Republicans en-
joyed a revival beginning in 1818, when they jousted with "National Re-
publicans" over the merits of an extensive program of federal public 
works.77 This revival stemmed primarily from the growing realization 
among slaveholders that the rise of the executive departments had ren-
dered their gloomy warnings about the dangers of governmental consoli-
dation less a paranoid fantasy than a realistic fear. 
Old Republicans exerted a major influence upon the 1828 election cam-
paign and, eventually, the Democratic party. Few, to be sure, had sup-
portedJackson's presidential aspirations early on; indeed, most supported 
Crawford rather than Jackson in the election of 1824. Yet with Jackson's 
controversial defeat, many concluded-if often begrudgingly-that Jack-
son was a superior alternative to Adams in 1828. 
Old Republicans provided Jackson not only with votes but also with 
an intellectual rationale for his campaign.78 In particular, they made ex-
plicit the implicit threat that slaveholders had always believed a strong 
central government posed to the institution of slavery. Even before the 
Missouri crisis, North Carolina congressman Nathaniel Macon had 
warned that any augmentation in the mandate of the central government 
could foster certain kinds of civic engagement that might challenge slave-
holder prerogatives. Macon found especially troubling the recent estab-
lishment of nationally oriented voluntary associations such as the Ameri-
can Colonization Society (1816). Should legislators "stretch" the 
Constitution by authorizing the construction of public works, Macon 
warned in a private letter to a political ally, these voluntary associations-
animated as they were by a "character and spirit of perseverance, border-
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ing on enthusiasm"-would undoubtedly "push them to try the question 
of emancipation. "79 During the congressional debate that preceded the 
enactment of the General iurvey Act, Virginia congressman John Ran-
dolph gave public expression to Macon's private concern. Should Con-
gress enact this bill, Randolph warned, it could "emancipate every slave 
in the United States-and with stronger color of reason than they can 
exercise the power now contended for." 80 
The relationship between a broadened government mandate and anti-
slavery was often oblique. No responsible public figure seriously contem-
plated attacking slavery directly within the states. Yet few doubted, as the 
Missouri crisis had revealed, that slavery was vulnerable on the margins. 
And here lay the danger. Should Congress enact a major new legislative 
initiative-such as a national system of public works-it risked not only 
stretching the Constitution, as Macon had feared, but also, and no less 
ominously, strengthening antislavery sentiment in the North and the 
West. This was because-or so both champions and critics of a broadened 
government mandate assumed-government-sponsored economic devel-
opment would encourage alternatives to slave-based agriculture that 
would increase economic opportunities for free labor. 81 Equally troubling 
were the various proposals to relocate free blacks outside of the country 
and to compensate slaveholders for the emancipation of their slaves. If 
enacted, such proposals would almost certainly undermine popular sup-
port for slavery in the border states-where the institution was weak-
and build popular support for its conditional termination in the rest of 
the country. 82 
Few legislative initiatives sparked more concern than the linkage of a 
compensated slave emancipation with a public land sale. Land-for-slave 
swaps had been debated in Congress as early as 1790 and were extensively 
discussed during the Missouri crisis. 83 "For one," declared Illinois con-
gressman Daniel P. Cook in February 1820, "I am prepared to devote 
every inch of the public soil west of the Mississippi, if so much shall be 
necessary, to the redemption of our country from this fatal, this deplor-
able evil."84 The issue reemerged five years later, on the eve of Adams's 
inauguration, when New York senator Rufus King proposed that under 
certain circumstances the revenue from all future land sales be "inviolably 
applied" to the effiancipation of slaves and the relocation of free blacks 
outside of the United States.85 In 1832, Clay included in a land bill the 
proviso that Congress designate revenue generated by land sales for the 
relocation of free blacks outside of the country. 
Legislative proposals to rid the United States of its black population 
are understandably unpalatable to present-day sensibilities, inflected, as 
they were, by the pervasive racism of the age. Yet they were the only 
administrative response to the slavery issue that stood the slightest chance 
' i' 
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of enactment. Had Congress opposed the relocation of free blacks, it 
could never have considered the question of emancipation, since all pro-
posals to end slavery were vulnerable to the unanswerable objection that 
they might leave former slaves in close physical proximity to their former 
enslavers.86 
No Jacksonian was more forthright in his analysis of the political impli-
cations of the slavery issue than Duff Green. In the final months of the 
1828 campaign, Green privately warned several correspondents of the 
perilous consequences for the Union should a North-West political alli-
ance agitate the slavery issue to consolidate its power. 87 "The antislave 
party in the North is dying away/' Green wrote reassuringly to a l(entuck-
ian a few months before the election, and a Jackson-Calhoun victory 
would "put it to sleep for twenty years": "Upon this subject I know more 
than I can prudently communicate by paper." It has been "part of my 
business"~Green boasted, in reference to the slavery issue-to "prevent 
the agitation of that question." Green's sensitivity on this score led him 
to oppose the substitution of DeWitt Clinton for Calhoun as Jackson's 
running mate. Clinton, as a nonslaveholder, might have been expected 
to appease antislavery voters in the North and, thus, help forestall the 
emergence of a North-West antislavery party. Yet Green opposed him any-
way. "The very reasons which induce you as a slaveholder to support 
Mr. Clinton," Green explained to the I(entuckian, "prompt me as a slave-
holder to oppose him." The only way to "keep down" the "antislave 
party" in the United States was to identify it with the antiwar Federalist 
party of 1812, which Clinton had led. 88 
Characteristic of Green's prosouthern, proslavery orientation was his 
eagerness to run two slaveholders-Jackson and Calhoun-on the same 
presidential ticket, an eV-ent unique in American political history, and one 
that could conceivably have inflamed disunionist sentiment in the North. 
"Some object to the nomination of Mr. Calhoun because he is from the 
south and a slaveholding state," Green conceded. Yet this was "so much 
the better": "Now is the time to crush the demon of disunion-roll the 
chariot wheels of Jackson's popularity over it, and it will be ages before 
it can again raise its head in our land. " 89 
Green's candor on the slavery issue spoke directly to the new political 
realities that had grown out of the Missouri crisis. Green never doubted 
that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to regulate slavery 
within the states. Indeed, Green himself had forcefully argued this posi-
tion as a delegate to the Missouri constitutional convention in 1820-
and had publicly declared that liberty-including, presumably, the liberty 
to own slaves-was for him dearer than the privilege of remaining within 
the Union.90 Green recognized that, at least for the moment, the antislav-
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determination of northerners to make restrictions on slavery a condition 
for Missouri statehood-and with good reason. Restriction, after all, 
raised the specter that at s~e future juncture the central government 
might take even more direct steps to restrict slaveholder prerogatives-
including those of Missouri slaveholders such as Green himself. And for 
Green, this was the crux of the matter. The very malleability of govern-
mental institutions made it impossible to know for certain whether some 
antislavery scheme might someday succeed. In an age in which the central 
government was steadily broadening its mandate, the executive depart-
ments were becoming increasingly powerful and autonomous, and volun-
tary associations were fast emerging as effective vehicles of popular mobi-
lization-and in the absence of stable political parties to direct and diffuse 
popular dissent-every presidential election became a referendum, not 
only on a particular candidate or on a specific policy agenda, but on the 
future of the Union.91 
Green's apprehensions concerning possible future assaults on slave-
holder prerogatives were subtly reinforced by his personal familiarity with 
antislavery activists. Green was related by marriage to Daniel P. Cook, the 
Kentucky-born Illinois congressman who had forcefully attacked slavery 
during the Missouri crisis. And Cook, as it happens, was an ardent ad-
mirer of John Quincy Adams-and, apparently, something of an Adams 
protege. In the critical state-by-state House vote that gave Adams the pres-
idency, Cook, as the sole Illinois congressman, cast the state's vote for 
Adams. Several years earlier, during the Illinois statehood debate, Cook, 
as an Illinois newspaper editor, had urged the admission of Illinois as a 
free state-a controversial position that angered Illinois slaveholders, in-
cluding Green's own brother-in-law, and one that Illinois slaveholders 
tried to overturn as late as 1824. And in the fall of 1817, as the slavery 
issue was beginning to emerge as a national issue, Cook published in a 
Washington newspaper two remarkable open letters on the topic. 92 In 
these letters, Cook lambasted slaveholders as lazy and tyrannical, com-
pared rebellious slaves to the patriots of the American War of Indepen-
dence, and urged President Monroe to endorse legislation to hasten the 
abolition of slavery throughout the United States. Should future legislators 
emulate Cook's antislavery fervor, Green had little doubt that slaveholders 
would find themselves struggling to protect their prerogatives from a 
North-West antislavery alliance. Almost sixty years later, Green reprinted 
a substantial excerpt from the second of Cook's letters in his memoir, 
with the bold-and highly distorted-claim that their initial publication 
in 1817 marked the beginnings of the "antislavery conspiracy" to build a 
northern antislavery party. To combat this conspirac)r, Green declared, 
had been the goal of his political career, and the primary impetus behind 
his endorsement of Andrew Jackson in the election of 1828.93 
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Green's preoccupation with the slavery issue during the 1828 campaign 
was highly atypical, at least within Jackson's inner circle. Neither Kendall 
nor Francis P. Blair-nor even Jackson himself-gave the issue more than 
passing attention. In large measure, this was because they did not have 
to. With the exception of borderland outposts like Missouri and Illinois, 
the ramparts of slavery were so well defended that the Jacksonians could 
focus their attention on issues that were less potentially divisive. The pau-
city of references by Jacksonian party leaders to slavery-even in personal 
correspondence-during a political campaign notorious for its raucous 
vulgarity has often been cited to demonstrate the unimportance of the 
issue. to the Jackson campaign.94 From Green's vantage point-shaped, as 
it had been, by his personal familiarity with the precariousness of slavery 
in Missouri and Illinois-the submergence of the slavery issue was, on 
the contrary, a tribute to his success at preventing it from once again 
commanding attention on the national stage.95 
Green's Jacksonianism was unabashedly opportunistic. A Calhounite 
at heart, he abandoned Jackson shortly after the election; by 1830, he 
was endorsing public positions that Jackson opposed. In the 1840 elec-
tion, Green backed the Whigs, and, in 1861, he cast his lot with the Con-
federacy, running iron mills in Alabama and Tennessee during the Civil 
War. In 1828, however, these events lay in the future. In the final, frenzied 
months of the 1828 election campaign, it was Green-the prime editorial 
spokesman for the Jackson campaign-who rallied the faithful with the 
promise of preferment. In many ways, this made Green the most represen-
tative Jacksonian of them all.96 
Almost half a century ago, British political scientist S. E. Finer under-
scored the administratiVe achievements of the central government in the 
United States in the period preceding the Jacksonian ascendancy. ('On the 
eve of Jackson's election, i• Finer wrote, "the United States administrative 
system was a going concern, steadily expanding its services and progres-
sively adapting its organization to the new burdens." As a student of Brit-
ish public administration-which, in the early nineteenth century, re-
mained a patronage engine for the well connected and the well to do-
Finer was in_ an excellent position to acknowledge this notably American 
achievement.97 
This essay has contended that the rise of the executive departments in 
the 1820s was a necessary-though not sufficient-precondition for the 
establishment of the Democratic party. Institutions beget institutions; no-
where was this truism more aptly illustrated than by the changes set in 
motion with Jackson's victory in _the election of 1828. The Jacksonian co-
alition was midwife to the party the executive departments spawned. Jack-
son's Democratic party championed a legislative agenda that grew directly 
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out of the determination of party leaders-such as Duff Green-to keep 
the slavery issue off the national political agenda. In pursuit of this g~al, 
the Jackson administration su,;pported policies that weakened the organiza-
tional capabilities of the central government and protected the vested inter-
ests of the slaveholders who dominated its party's political base. 
The Jacksonian ascendancy-and, with it, the flowering of «Jacksonian 
Democracy" -is best understood as a problem neither of classes, nor even 
of regions, but of entitlements. In the years preceding the election of 18~8, 
ordinary Americans presumed themselves entitled to an ever increasing 
array of government benefits. In response to this popular movement, J~ck­
sonian Democracy was born. Here, then, was one of the most curious 
ironies of the age: the first national political party to call itself democratic 
was programmatically committed to limiting the role of the government 
in American life. 
The influence of the Jacksonians on the democratization of American 
politics is easily exaggerated. White male suffrage antedated the Jackso-
nian ascendancy, as did the advent of an avowedly egalitarian and often 
populistic style of electioneering.98 Long before the maki~g. of the Dem?-
cratic party, and long after it as well, voluntary assoc1at1on~, often m 
conjunction with third parties and reform movements, po~ularized caus~s 
far more progressive than anything even the most radical Democratic 
party leader would have found politically possible to sustain.99 To dismiss 
such impulses as peripheral to the "partisan imperative" of two-party 
competition makes sense only if one assumes a priori that the mass .par~ 
was the logical fulfillment of the promise of democracy. Even rotation in 
office-the most avowedly democratic of the Jacksonians' innovations-
did little to increase the access of previously underrepresented groups to 
public office.100 In addition, by institutionalizing what has aptl~ been 
called an "alienating grammar of corruption," it might well have discour-
aged civic engagement. 101 It may, in short, be time to reconsider :whether 
rotation ought to be regarded as a core element of the democratic creed. 
The Jacksonians may have succeeded in limiting the role of the govern-
ment in American life, yet they failed to keep the slavery issue off the 
national political agenda. The abolitionist mails controversy in 1835 
dashed their hopes. When the leaders of the American Anti-Slavery Soci-
ety used the facilities of the Post Office Department to agitate the slavery 
issue in the slaveholding states, they sparked a swift and hostile reaction 
not only from slaveholders but also from Postmaster General l(endall .and 
President Jackson. Almost immediately, antiabolitionist mobs sprang into 
action in the North as well as the South, with the covert endorsement 
of prominent Jacksonians, including Vice President Martin Van Bu~en. 
Jackson himself proposed sweeping antiabolitionist legislation,. :'hi~h, 
though unsuccessful, fueled the growing suspicion of radical abolitionists 
'.: 
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that the ~entral government had become the pliant tool of a grasping 
sla:e~ol~mg.ca~al. No longer would the postal system remain the nation-
bu1ld1ng 1nstltutlon that Channing had proclaimed it to be as recently as 
1829. Henceforth, it would exacerbate the long-smoldering conflict over 
sl~v_ery that would continue without interruption from 1835 until the 
Civil War.102 
Jackson's strident antiabolitionism is a pointed reminder of the trou-
blmg legacy of the antidevelopmental agenda that his administration en-
dorsed. In the absence of outside coercion, it is unrealistic to assume that 
a full-scale .slave emancipation could have succeeded in the nineteenth-
century United States. Peaceful emancipations required the intervention 
~fa central government, a~ in the British West Indies; violent emancipa-
tions follow~d s~ave rebellions, as in Haiti.103 The voluntary, state-spon-
s?red .emanc1pation up~n which so ~any statesmen of Jefferson's genera-
t1?n invested such high hopes-including, albeit fitfully, Jefferson 
himself-was doomed to fail. 
It is impossible to know if the developmental agenda of Adams and. 
C~ay. might, u~der different circu~~tanc:s, have ended slavery peacefully 
w1th~n the l!n1ted States. Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that slaveholder 
dom1n~nce. m national politics was so formidable that any deliberate aug-
mentation in the mand~te o~ th: central government would, alternatively, 
have hastene~ the nat1onahzation of slavery-just as Abraham Lincoln 
would come m the 1850s to fear. Yet there can be little doubt that-just 
as Duff Green had mtended-the antidevelopmental agenda of Andrew 
Ja:kson and An:ios !Cendall left slaveholder prerogatives intact. By weak-
~n1~g rI:e organ1zational capabilities of the central government-the only 
1nst1tut1~n that coul~ have peacefully orchestrated a slave emancipation-
Jackson s Democratic party made the perpetuation of the Union contin-
~ent on the suppression of antislavery, and the agitation of the slavery 
issue a prelude to civil war. 
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Chapter Four 
THE LEGAL TRANS'FORMATION OF CITIZENSHIP 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 
WILLIAM J. NOVAK 
We n1ust not thrust our modern "State-concept" upon the 
reluctant material. 
-Frederic William Maitland 
HISTORIANS SEARCH for ways to reintroduce "the political" 
back into American history, one interpretive possibility that can-
not be overlooked is the idea of citizenship. The Concept of citi-
zenship is in the midst of an extraordinary theoretical revival.1 For good 
reasons. First, citizenship has the potential to integrate social and political 
history. Citizenship directs attention precisely to that point where bottom-
up constructions of rights consciousness and political participation meet 
the top-down policies and formal laws of legislatures, courts, and admin-
istrative agencies.2 Second, citizenship deals directly with what has be-
come a preeminent social and political question in our time-inclusion 
and exclusion based on identity. Third, citizenship brings the state back 
in, focusing attention on the claims and obligations of the rights-bearing 
subject in distinctly modern nation-states. Fourth, citizenship brings de-
mocracy back in, illuminating issues of civic participation and the con-
struction of civil society.3 Fifth (taking a cue from T. H. Marshall's influ-
ential discussion "Citizenship and Social Class"), the citizenship 
framework can expansively incorporate three different kinds of rights-
civil, political, and socioeconomic-integrating in a single developmental 
story the early emergence of property and contract, nineteenth-century 
struggles over suffrage, and the rise of twentieth-century social welfare 
states.4 Finally, the language of citizenship transfers smoothly to the dis-
cussion of transnational politics in an increasingly global, multicultural 
world. Citizenship thus has much to recommend to American political 
historians. 
But the so-called citizenship debates bring one potential hazard to a 
discussion of American politics (particularly nineteenth-century American 
politics), and that is the danger of anachronism. For most recent discus-
sions of American citizenship have been framed by the t~oroughly modern 
THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 
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